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While the health effects of COVID-19 are being widely report-
ed, less is known about the economic, social, and security im-
pacts of the pandemic. This brief reports on the risks of and 
resilience to the COVID-19 pandemic among informal sector 
vendors in Lagos, Africa's largest city with a population of 
more than 24 million. Their experiences are indicative of 
those of a large and particularly vulnerable subset of the pop-
ulation in the developing world—actors in the urban informal 
economy—who live day to day and whose economic activities 
are deeply impacted by the crisis.  
Informal market vendors face risks that are both economic and 
personal. Economically, they risk loss of income, increased 
household food insecurity, and need to draw down business 
savings or assets. Personally, they face anxiety about the secu-
rity of their business, increased criminal activity targeting their 
home or business, and even increased violence within their 
own home. While most vendors experienced hardship during 
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
The economic impact of 
COVID-19 is especially severe 
for members of the informal 
economy. 
 
Risk and resilience among this 
population are unequal.  
 
Identity, not poverty, is the 
most important driver of risk 
and resilience among vendors 
in Lagos. 
 
The crisis has also increased 
social polarization among 
groups.  
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2 the initial months of the pandemic and associ-
ated lockdown, vendors face differential risk 
and are differentially resilient.  
This report focuses on how identity—in this 
case ethnicity and indigeneity—affects the 
economic impact of the COVID crisis and mod-
erates access to state benefits. We will show 
that although other characteristics such as 
wealth can play a role, identities are key de-
terminants of one's experience of the crisis. 
Because these factors may be overlooked in 
economic targeting of policy responses, we 
focus our attention on issues of identity. First, 
we examine how identity, among other fac-
tors, moderates risk and resilience in the 
wake of the early part of the crisis. Second, we 
examine how the crisis may have feedback 
effects on identity cleavages and the relation-
ship between different groups and the gov-
ernment.  
LAGOS IN THE WAKE OF COVID-19  
To curb the spread of COVID, the Nigerian 
government imposed travel bans, closed 
schools, and prohibited mass gatherings. On 
March 30th, President Buhari placed Lagos, 
neighboring state Ogun, and the capitol city 
Abuja in total lockdown, ordering all residents 
to remain at home and shutting down all but 
essential businesses. While markets were 
closed down, vendors selling food and grocer-
ies were allowed to operate for four hours 
every 48 hours.1 The full lockdown, which 
lasted for over five weeks, prevented many 
Lagosians working in the informal sector from 
conducting their business or traveling to 
work. 
To cushion the economic impacts of COVID, 
the federal and state governments distributed 
food palliatives and cash transfers to vulnera-
ble residents in Lagos. These policies were 
reportedly targeted to the most vulnerable. 
But, these economic stimulus packages are 
not without controversy. Some citizens allege 
that the distribution process is politicized, 
with party members and “middlemen” com-
mandeering the distribution and taking the 
lion’s share for themselves.2 Others say that 
there is no assistance from the state, and they 
rely on religious and local networks for aid.3  
In May 2020 we conducted a randomized sur-
vey of informal market vendors in 146 mar-
kets across Lagos. Our data are able to shed 
light on the burden of the crisis and the 
sources of support informal vendors received. 
We can also observe whether benefits are in-
deed targeted to the most vulnerable, and 
whether the distribution of benefits is politi-
cized. To examine the latter, we analyze dif-
ferential access by groups that have historical-
ly had privileged access in Lagos. In particu-
lar, members of the Yoruba ethnicity domi-
nate state and local politics and tend to be ad-
vantaged by their position in clientelistic net-
works that grant them easier access to gov-
ernment attention in exchange for political 
support. While Yoruba are more likely to be 
indigenous to Lagos, there are Yoruba resi-
dents that hail from outside Lagos state 
whose families have arrived more recently. 
This introduces an additional cleavage we ex-
plore: that between indigenous and non-
indigenous Yoruba.  
STUDY SAMPLE 
The survey data in this report capitalizes on 
prior work with Adrienne Lebas and Janica 
Magat of a representative sample of market 
vendors,4 making rapid data collection at a 
distance feasible among this otherwise hard-
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to-reach population. Our survey successfully 
reached 868 of 1179 vendors (74%) who 
completed the most recent survey from our 
previous project. Of these, exactly half of the 
868 vendors reached belong to the majority 
Yoruba ethnicity. Seven percent of all re-
spondents report that their families are origi-
nally from Lagos state; we thus consider them 
indigenes. All of respondents indigenous to 
Lagos are also of the Yoruba ethnicity.  
IDENTITY MATTERS 
The economic impact of the lockdown is evi-
dent among our study population. Almost half 
of vendors reported their shops were closed 
at the time of the survey; all but two percent 
of the remaining sample reported being af-
fected by limited hours or alternate locations. 
Among the economic consequences of lock-
down, the most commonly cited are loss of 
income (70%), lack of access to food (37%), 
and loss of electricity or water (13%). Aver-
age weekly income drops by more than half 
relative to our data from 2018.  
Reported knowledge of and access to state 
benefits in response to the crisis is limited. 
Only 29% of the sample saying they know 
about steps the government is taking to help 
people. Many fewer actually received benefits: 
5% of the sample said their household re-
ceived benefits and 2.5% said their business 
received benefits. About 16% of the sample 
said they applied to government benefits to 
support their business.  
Investigating the determinants of risk, we see 
that respondents with greater cash savings 
were less likely to be food insecure during the 
crisis. However, we found no evidence that 
access to state benefits was correlated with 
vulnerability. Instead, the only consistent pat-
terns we found in the application and access 
to state benefits were identity-related. Yoruba 
respondents, members of the ethnic majority, 
were significantly more likely to access and 
apply to state benefits. Furthermore, as sum-
marized in Figure 1, controlling for other de-
mographic characteristics, Yoruba respond-
ents were significantly less likely to report 
negative economic effects of COVID including 
shop closures and food insecurity.5 
THE PANDEMIC EXACERBATES 
EXISTING IDENTITY CLEAVAGES 
A growing concern in developed and develop-
ing countries alike is increasing polarization 
along partisan or other group lines, often ex-
acerbated by increased access to information 
and social media. This type of polarization 
could be particularly dangerous in times of 
crises because it can incite some groups to 
blame other groups for the crisis as well as 
advocate for denying access to needed bene-
fits on the basis of group status. In Nigeria, as 
in many other African democracies, the over-
lap between ethnicity and partisan affiliation 
contributes to increasing affective polariza-
tion as overlapping social and political bound-
aries further enshrine barriers across groups. 
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Source: Author’s survey data 
Figure 1: Economic implications of ethnic identity  
We find evidence that the negative economic 
effects of the crisis contributed to polarization 
and xenophobia among our sample of re-
spondents. Specifically, we find that shop clo-
sures increased polarization (distaste for the 
outgroup) among Yoruba and their likelihood 
of identifying with an exclusive group (their 
ethnicity) relative to an inclusive group (their 
city). Experiences of food insecurity increased 
feelings of xenophobia among the Yoruba as 
well.  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The COVID crisis has laid bare existing ine-
qualities in Nigeria just as it has in the United 
States and elsewhere. Our data suggest that 
differential experiences during the crisis can 
worsen these inequalities if governments ig-
nore them. We find additional evidence that 
the crisis decreased trust in government and 
reported willingness to pay tax. To avoid 
these ill effects in the future, we would recom-
mend the Lagos State Government increase 
transparency around eligibility rules for each 
policy and invest in better communication 
around the range of benefits being offered so 
that eligible individuals can make claims. To 
explicitly reduce future inequalities, commu-
nications about how to apply and gain access 
to benefits should also be funneled through 
organizations trusted by marginalized groups 
such as religious and marketplace associa-
tions. The cautionary tale told by our data 
could be instructive to other countries as well.  
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